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Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C. 
Computer programs' frustrate the law's traditional catego-
ries: they exhibit characteristics of both concrete property and 
abstract knowledge. 2 The courts and the literature widely debate 
whether programs are taxable,3 admissible as evidence,4 or eligi-
ble for copyright5 or patent protection.6 However, few courts have 
discussed whether contracts for computer programs are 
1. A computer program is a series of instructions for a computer. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 
367 F. Supp. 258, 274 (N.D. Okla. 1973), modified, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 327 
(1974). 
2. The District of Columbia Circuit has stated that once a program is "in" a com-
puter, it becomes "knowledge." See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., 
465 F.2d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
3. See Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dept. of Assessments & Taxation, 271 
Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 
1976). Perhaps these cases seek to rationalize state statutes that tax some types of software 
but not others. See Heinzman, Computer Software: Should It Be Treated as Tangible 
Property for Ad Valorem Tax?, 37 J. TAX. 184 (1972). For a definition of software, see note 
17 infra and accompanying text. See also Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of Com-
' puter Software, 18 N.Y.L.F. 59 (1972). Some state statutes and some cases liistinguish 
applications programs from operations (or systems) programs. For a definition oftheselwo 
types of programs see, e.g., Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S. W .2d 405, 406 (Tenn. 
1976); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dept. of Assessments & Taxation, 271 Md. 
674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974); CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 995 (West Cum. Supp. 1975). That 
distinction probably stems from the difficulties of taxing applications programs. Applica-
tions programs are difficult to value because computer users generally design them them-
selves; and those that are purchased require frequent modification. In contrast, systems 
programs are acquired almost exclusively through the marketplace, because they are too 
long and complex for a computer user to make alone. A user would also obtain any 
significant modifications of a systems program through the marketplace. The asserted 
reason for not taxing applications programs - that they are not tangible personal property 
- applies with equal force to systems programs. This has not stopped some states from 
taxing systems programs, however. 
4. See Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 254 (1974); Tapper, Evidence from Computers, 8 GA. L. REv. 562 (1974). 
5. See Miller, Computers and Copyrights, in THE LAW OF COMPUTERS 107 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as THE LAW OF COMPUTERS]; Bender, Trade Secret Protection of 
Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970); Lorr, Copyright, Computers and Compulsory 
Licensing, 5 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & LAw 149 (1975). But see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). 
See generally R. BIGELOW & S. NvcuM, YoUR COMPUTER AND THE LAw 59-96 (1975). 
6. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 
1977), revd. sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See also Dann v. Johnson, 
425 U.S. 219 (1976), revg. 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (denying patent because the 
patented program was "obvious"). Based on a dictum of In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 ,I 
(C.C.P.A. 1969), the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals has permitted programs to be U 
patented. In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Comstock, 481 F.2d 905 
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A.1969). The Patent Office opposes 
any patenting of programs. See Dobyns & Block, Adequate Disclosure of Computers and 
Programs for Coryputers in Patent Specifications, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Socv. 574 (1974). 
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"transactions in goods" governed by article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 7 If the program is no more than a set of ideas, 
a contract to sell a program is a service contract and therefore is 
not covered by article 2.8 But a computer cannot read ideas; for 
abstract instructions to become a computer program, a techni-
cian must give those instructions a physical form. 0 That technical 
metamorphosis from abstract instructions to concrete programs 
suggests a legal metamorphosis from services to goods. rn 
This Note addresses the requirements for governing com-
puter program contracts by article 2 of the U.C.C.: that the sev-
eral methods of selling programs be "transactions in goods" and 
that the goods not be merely incidental to accompanying services. 
This Note concludes that contracts for program copies11 are, in 
most contexts, transactions within the scope of article 2. 
7. The closest cases concern programs sold with a computer. If the program is nc, 
tually in the machine when sold, the courts consider it merely part of the machine. These 
cases often do not mention that the computer contained programs. See, e.g., Triangle 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (U.C.C.'s four-
year limit on actions claiming breach of a sales contract for goods applied to sale of' 
computer hardware and software package); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 
389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202,343 N.Y.S.2d 
541 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Furthermore, where the programs are part of the contract for the 
computer but are to be delivered at a later time, the courts consider the obligation to 
deliver the programs incidental to the sale of the computers and hold that the entire 
transaction is under the U.C.C. Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 
2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1974); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp, 
325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974) (U.C.C. applied to a bundled 
contract). A computer contract is "bundled" when the purchase price includes the seller's 
programming services, whether or not the buyer wishes to use them. IBM lost several 
antitrust suits because of this practice, and it is seldom used today. See 361 F. Supp. at 
334 n.5. Cf. Public Utils. Commn. v. Burroughs Business Machs., Ltd., 34 D.L.R.3d 320 
(Ont. 1973); Burroughs Business Machs., Ltd. v, Feed-Rite Mills (1962), Ltd, 42 D.L.R.3d 
303 (Man. 1973) (Canadian cases, under the Canadian Sale of Goods Act, reaching similar 
results). See also F.&M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp, 988, 
992 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); UARCO, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 414 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 
(E.D. La. 1976). 
8. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER· 
CIAL CODE § 2-2 (1972). 
9. See Furth, Computers & the Practicing Lawyer, in THE LAw OF COMPUTERS, supra 
note 5, at 77. 
10. Significantly, large computer manufacturers have provided for the possibility 
that courts would find program contracts to be "transactions in goods" under article 2, 
See 2 COMPUTER L. SER\'., REP. apps. §§ 3-2b, 3-2c. 
11. Sine~ the word "program" may mean an embodiment of those instructions, the 
term "program copy" in this Note will refer to the embodiment of a program in machine-
readable form. 
Much of the law's frustration with computer programs results from confusing pro-
gram copies with their abstract instructions. The latter are not tangible; unless embodied 
in cards, tapes, or on paper, the instructions exist only in the programmers' minds. Rights 
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I. PROGRAM CONTRACTS AS TRANSACTIONS IN Goons 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to 
"transactions in goods"12 and defines goods as "[a]ll things (in-
cluding specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the 
time of identification to the contract. " 13 Although production of 
a good may demand substantial labor, this does not automati-
cally render a contract one for services. 14 Indeed, the U.C.C. ex-
pressly covers specially manufactured goods. 15 Thus, despite a 
labor-intensive production process, a computer program copy 
may still be a good if it meets the statutory definition. 
to such instructions can be conveyed, although courts ponder whether those rights are 
patents, trade secrets, copyrights, or contractual property rights. See notes 5 & 6 supra. 
But buying rights to a set of instructions is a different transaction from buying a tangible 
copy of those instructions. The intangible instructions are not a thing and therefore not a 
good under the U.C.C. 
In the recent decision of Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 
765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), reud. and remanded on other grounds, No. 78-7532 (2d Cir., filed 
July 17, 1979), the court did not acknowledge this distinction. In holding programs to be 
goods, the court stated: · 
Although the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed software remained 
Honeywell's intellectual property, Triangle was purchasing the product of these 
concepts. That product required efforts to produce, but it was a product neverthe-
less and, though intangible, is more readily characterized as "goods" than 
"services." L 
In the first sentence, the court appears to use this Note's distinction between buying 
the "intellectual property" of the program and a particular copy of it. In the second 
sentence, however, the court characterized the copy as intangible, indicating an entirely 
different distinction. The court distinguishes the underlying algorithms and problem-
solving theory from the intangible instructions that realize that theory. But the court does 
not complete the analysis and distinguish the intangible instructions from their tan•gible 
embodiment. 
This approach leads the court to the odd posture of labeling an intangible - which 
only exists in people's minds - as a "good." This is analogous to saying that music in an 
album or words in a book can be a "good." But music or words are not sold separately 
from albums or books; only their copyrights are severable. 
It also leads the court into the apparent contradiction of saying that the manufacturer 
retained the "intellectual property" rights. Under the court's scheme, the manufacturer 
retained rights to the underlying algorithms or ideas behind the program. But the law does 
not protect algorithms and ideas, only their physical realizations. See notes 5 & 6 supra. 
In addition, if the court meant to suggest that one could sell an abstract set of instructions 
(which is the realization of underlying algorithms and ideas) yet retain property rights in 
them, this is inconsistent with the analogous copyright law for music or words: a sale of 
the music or the words is a sale of the copyright. It is conceptually better to view the 
transaction as a sale of a physical copy of the instructions (analogous to a record album 
or a book) with retention of "intellectual property" rights (analogous to - and perhaps 
synonymous with - a copyright). 
12. u.c.c. § 2-102. 
13. u.c.c. § 2-105(1). 
14. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) (the U.C.C. covered a contract 
for a bowling alley although the installation required substantial labor). 
15. u.c.c. § 2-105(1). 
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A "good" must be a "thing" that is "movable." A computer 
program copy is surely distinguishable from pure thought; there-
fore, it is logical for the law to consider that copy a tangible 
"thing" independeht of the ideas and intangible instructions it 
communicates. 16 Also, program copies are "movable" in any of 
their three principal forms: software, memory devices, or data 
transmissions. This Note uses the term software for machine-
readable media that carry program copies, such as magnetic 
cards, paper cards, or tape. 17 Such media are unquestionably 
movable. Memory devices18 - generally magnetic tapes, discs, or 
drums on which program copies are stored at computer installa-
16. Compare, for example, a program copy with an intangible property right such as 
a patent. A patent cannot do anything by itself; rather it permits its holder to do things. 
On the other hand, a program copy can do things by itself; it can run a computer. A patent 
needs no physical form independent of legal paper establishing its existence, while a 
program copy must be embodied to be read by a computer, independently of any legal 
paper asserting its existence. 
17. But see District of Columbia v. Universal Computers Assocs., 465 F.2d 615, 618 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (a computer program is "intangible knowledge" and must not be confused 
with the punch cards used to enter it in the computer). "Software," like many computer 
terms, has several meanings. See Honeywell, Inc., v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 
406, 408 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Heinzman, supra note 3, at 185; Miller, supra note 5, at 113. 
The term "software" sometimes is used narrowly to refer to specific media that are pro-
grammed. See, e.g., Law Research Serv., Inc. v. General Automation, Inc., 494 F.2d 202, 
204 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974) ("software" includes punch cards, memory tapes, and paper tapes 
programmed to instruct the computer). "Software" also commonly refers to all the pro-
gram copies of a particular party. See, e.g., Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 
338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd. per curiam, 458 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1972) 
("software" refers to the program and controls which are used in the computer). The term, 
however, is often given a more expansive meaning. See, e.g., University Computing Co. 
v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518,527 (5th Cir. 1974) ("software" including pro-
grams, programming instructions, and computer language listings); Accountant's Com-
puter Servs., Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 123-24, 298 N.E.2d 519, 522 (1973). 
Under these expansive definitions "software" is the obverse of "hardware," which gener-
ally refers to the machinery: the computer and its mechanical and electronic appurte-
nances. Some media used as software, such as magnetic tape, can also be used as memory 
devices. See note 18 infra. This Note distinguishes the two classes by the intended use of 
the medium. If used to transport programs, it is software; if used to store programs at a 
computer installation, it is a memory device. 
18. For a description of memory devices, see generally Telex v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 
258 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (fact 31, at 275); Furth, supra note 9, at 79-80. Most such devices 
are magnetic and many are not contained within the computer equipment itself. See 
Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (describing a magnetic 
drum memory device). These devices may be used as either software or memory devices. 
See note 17 supra. Some devices are contained within the computer, such as a magnetic 
"core." See Sperry-Rand Corp. v. Petronix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1970) 
(describing magnetic core memory). New devices now or soon to be used include magnetic 
bubbles and semiconductor memory. See Hodges, Microelectronic Memories, SCIENTIFIC 
AM., Sept. 1977, at 130, 131. 
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tions - are also movable. 19 The third medium for a program copy 
is a data transmission which travels as electrical impulses over 
telephone cables or as electromagnetic radiation. 20 Since courts 
have found electricity to be movable because it passes through 
wires, 21 any form of data transmission is probably a "movable 
thing" under the U.C.C. 
Article 2, however, requires not only the existence of movable 
things, but also a transaction in goods identified to the contract. 22 
Courts have interpreted "transaction" broadly, 23 frequently stat-
ing that dealings "analogous to a sale"24 in economic effect, such 
as leases, should receive identical treatment under the U.C.C.25 
But even under a liberal interpretation of "transaction," some 
19. See Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (magnetic 
drums); Storage Technology Corp., 3 COMPUTER L. SERv. REP. 407, 409 (Aug. 18, 1971) 
(decision of Comptroller General discusses discs and tape drives). Internal memory de-
vices are also movable and are sometimes added onto existing computers. See, e.g., Ad-
vanced Memory Sys., Inc. v. IBM, 3 COMPUTER L. SERv. REP. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dis-
cusses the addition of a magnetic core to a computer). In any event, the computers 
themselves generally are movable, and thus any internal memory device would be as well. 
20. Electromagnetic radiation includes both light and microwaves. According to pres-
ent theories of the physical properties of such radiation, light and microwave transmis-
sions consist of particles travelling at the speed of light. See 4 BERKELEY PHYSICS COURSE 
§§ 4.6, 4.7, 5.1 (1970). Like electricity, such transmissions can be bought and sold. See 
note 21 infra. 
21. Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176,287 N.E.2d 608 (1972). See 
also Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 694 (1975) (applied the U.C.C. by 
analogy). Although Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 
196 N.W.2d 316 (1972), appears to reach the opposite conclusion, the court in that case 
never actually reached the issue. The court merely noted that, under Michigan law, even 
if electricity were considered a good, the U.C.C. would not ch~ge the outcome of the case. 
The court in Helvey based its decision on the nature of electricity. 151 Ind. App. at 179, 
278 N.E.2d at 610. The court noted that electricity could be bought, bartered, and sold, 
as well as taxed and stolen. The court held that electricity was movabl~, since it "passed 
through the meter." In Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 
(1964), the court compared electricity in wires to natural gas in pipes, which has been held 
to be a good. 
22. u.c.c. § 2-102. 
23. See 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-102:4 (2d ed.1970); J. WHITE 
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 8, § 9-6. Anderson views "transactions". as including equip-
ment leases, mixed sales-service contracts, and, unless the context otherwise requires, 
any dealings with respect to "goods." 
24. This test was first mentioned in Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Co., 244 Ark. 943, 428 
S.W.2d 46 (1968). Cf. Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (1970) (notes that Sawyer interprets 
"transaction" narrowly and argues for a broader test). 
25. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearinghouse, Inc., 
59 Misc. 2d 226, 229, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 (Civ. Ct. 1969), revd. on other grounds, 64 
Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Term 1970). See also Cintrone v. Hertz Truck 
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). 
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particular good must be "identified to the contract"26 for there to 
be an article 2 transaction. Unlike the typical sale, in which one 
item is manufactured and delivered, a program contract often 
involves several distinct program copies.27 There is no "trans-
action in goods" unless one of those copies is the identifiable 
subject of the program contract. 
The transport copy - the computer program copy that the 
seller delivers to the buyer for rent or sale - is probably the good 
that the parties to a program contract identify with the transac-
tion. 28 It is the only copy that sellers would warrant: no seller 
assumes responsibility for the recording skills of memory devices 
of the buyer. It is also precisely what buyers want warranted:20 
26. U.C.C. § 2-105(1)(2). See also U.C.C. § 2-401, -501. The U.C.C. replaces reliance 
on the passing of title as the key to a transaction with this concept of identification of the 
goods to the contract. See Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 251 
S.E.2d 10 (1975). 
27. Ordinarily, a program copy is developed at the seller's computer. To deliver a 
copy to the buyer, the seller duplicates the program copy on software, and transports the 
duplicates to the buyer's computer. The duplicate is read into the buyer's computer and 
copied on a memory device. Thus, there are at least three copies: the original, the dupli-
cate, and the buyer's final copy on a memory device. 
28. U.C.C. § 2-501 covers the manner of identifying goods to the contract. The parties 
are free to agree on the manner of identification. In the absence of an agreement, subsec-
tions (a) and (b) indicate the manner of identification. 
(1) The buyer obtains a special property and insurable interest in goods by 
identification of existing goods as goods to which the contract refers even though 
the goods so identified are non-conforming and he has an option to return or reject 
them. Such identification can be made at any time and in any manner explicitly 
agreed to by the parties. In the absence of explicit agreement identification occurs 
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing 
and identified; (b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other than 
those described in paragraph (c), when goods are shipped, marked or other-
wise designated by the seller as goods to which the "contract refers. • .• 
In the typical program contract, subsection (b) would indicate that the program copy in 
transport (e.g., the good "shipped") is the subject of the contract. 
It is, however, the memory copy that is tested and cured in actual use. Thus it can 
be agrued that when a program copy is conditionally accepted, even when software is sold 
and copied, the buyer actually accepts the memory copy since that is the copy to be cured, 
This result should not follow. First, the software itself is cured when the memory copy is 
cured. Certainly such a cure would satisfy the parties because the curing of one copy cures 
all. Second, a conditional acceptance need not derive from U.C.C. § 2-608 (acceptance 
under assumption of cure), but from a clause in the contract or an understanding between 
the parties which gives the buyer the right to rescind if the copy on memory is not cured. 
Cf. note 59 infra (curing of memory copy as satisfying U.C.C. § 2-608). Thus, despite the 
curing of the memory copy, the buyer is not apt to view the memory copy as the one 
identified to the contract. 
29. The buyer does not usually expect a specially manufactured program to be perfect 
when delivered. Instead, it is tested in use and then perfected. See, e.g., Carl Beasley Ford, 
Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a/fd., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (in view of the complexity of programming, eight months is a reasonable time 
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they expect the purchased program to function properly but will 
bear the risk of their own mishandling after delivery. 
The transport copy of a computer program is identifiable to 
the contract whether sold as software, relayed as an electronic 
data transmission, or loaned as software to be copied on the 
buyer's memory device. Acquiring a program copy by purchasing 
software presents the clearest case of an identified good. Such a 
software purchase is strikingly analogous to a purchase of record 
albums or cassette tapes. A record buyer wants music, but buys 
the record. A software buyer wants a computer program, but buys 
the software. The record buyer can copy the music onto a tape, 
as many audiophiles do, and the U.C.C. will still cover the record 
sale. In the same way, the software buyer will almost always copy 
the program onto a memory device in his computer system. The 
possibility of transforming the program should not remove the 
software sale from article 2 coverage. 30 
Program copies relayed to buyers as data transmissions also 
can easily be identified to the contract. Data transmissions are 
very similar to electrical transmissions, 31 and since the latter are 
covered by the U.C.C., the former should be as well.32 The short 
of "adjustment" before rejection is required); -Burroughs Business Machs., Ltd. v. Feed-
Rite Mills (1962), Ltd., 42 D.L.R.3d 303 (Man. 1973) (buyer allowed to reject computer 
and programs under the Canadian Sale of Goods Act after several months· possession 
because of problems in perfecting the programs). See also Pezzillo v. GTE Information 
Sys., Inc., 414 F. Supp.1257, 1259 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (describes the processes of program-
ming and debugging - the curing of program defects). 
30. Unfamiliarity with computer programs causes two lingering problems that are 
clarified by the record album analogy. First, some argue that a program transaction 
conveys not the software itself, but the "intellectual property" of the program. While this 
argument may have some validity, it applies with equal force to the sale of music on a 
record album, which is clearly under the U.C.C. 
Secondly, it is argued that the program contract concerns not the transported copy 
(the software), but the final copy which was made from the software and is contained on 
the memory devices of the buyer's computer. However, when a record buyer tapes a 
purchased record the U.C.C. still covers the record sale. A buyer can consume or dispose 
of a purchased good in many ways without removing the original sale from the U.C.C. 
The analogy between music on records and programs on software, however, is not 
exact. Sellers of records do not warrant the music itself, but a seller of software will 
warrant the programs. A record shop only stands behind the physical quality of its al-
bums; the music itself is sold "as is." Consider another kind of recording, such as a record 
to teach a foreign language. In that sale, the seller probably would warrant the accuracy 
of the translation. There also may be policy reasons for not requiring the retailer of a 
record to warrant the music. Cf. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1977) (seller of cookbook not liable for breach of warranty when a recipe failed to mention 
an ingredient was poisonous if cooked improperly). 
31. See text at note 21 supra. 
32. See note 21 supra. 
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time that the copy spends in that form poses no problem, for even 
during its very brief life it can be identified. Short-lived goods are 
goods nonetheless. 33 
The third type of identifiable program copy is the borrowed 
copy that the buyer records in a memory device and then returns 
to the seller. Although this borrowing is brief, 34 the transaction is 
sufficiently "analogous to a sale"35 to be subject to article 2. The 
economic result of a software loan is indistinguishable from a 
software sale. The price is apt to be the same in either case.36 The 
customer ultimately uses a memory-device copy rather than the 
original software.37 The only difference is the method of delivery: 
the program is copied rather than conventionally delivered.38 
Since the two transactions yield identical results, the courts 
should co_nsider a software loan a "transaction in goods" like a 
33. See the cases applying the U.C.C. to contracts for electricity or natural gas in note 
21 supra. 
34. Leases that have been considered transactions under the U.C.C. have been of 
longer duration than several minutes or hours. For instance, a five-year lease was involved 
in Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearinghouse, Inc., 59 Misc. 
2d 226,298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct.1969), revd. per-euriam, 64 Misc. 2d 910,316 N.Y.S.2d 
585 (App. Term 1970). In Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 514 
P.2d 1184 (1975), the court applied the U.C.C. to a two-month rental of dirt moving 
machines. Usually, however, courts apply it to shorter leases either in part only or by 
analogy. See W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970) 
(the U.C.C. applied to a month-to-month lease of equipment as a matter of public policy); 
Washwell, Inc. v. Morejon, 294 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (implied warranty of 
fitness covered the use of a coin-operated washing machine; no mention of the U.C.C,); 
Baker v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971) (U.C.C. applied in part to the 
rental of a golf cart for several hours). See generally All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 
Idaho 873, 877, 538 P.2d 1177, 1181 (1975) (discusses the extension of U.C.C. warranties 
by analogy); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co. - Div. of Harsco, 77 Misc. 2d 992, 354 
N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (the U.C.C. applied in full to a lease of scaffolding equip-
ment for several weeks), revd. mem., 50 App. Div. 2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1974) (while 
the U.C.C.:implied warranty could apply, the U.C.C. statute of limitations should not). 
35. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
36. The price is likely to be the same because the cost of the material is negligible. 
In United States Leasing· Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 1082, 319 
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. 1971), the court held that where the contract price of a lease is as 
large as the sale price of the same item, the transactions are parallel and public policy 
requires that the U.C.C. cover the lease. 
37. Even in the sale of software, the buyer only uses the software to create a new copy 
on a memory device, and the software is worth little thereafter. The cost of the material 
is negligible compared to the cost of developing the program; and the software has little 
resale value, either because the program is specially manufactured, or because the seller 
retains proprietary rights in the program to prevent the buyer from reselling it. The buyer, 
however, may store the software as security should the program copy on the memory 
device be erased inadvertently. Also, the buyer can reuse some types of software such as 
erasable magnetic tape. 
38. This satisfies the "sufficiently analogous to a sale" test. See note 24 supra. 
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software sale, with the borrowed copy being the "identified" 
good. 
Furthermore, an observer must question the policy of remov-
ing these transactions from article 2 simply because the buyer 
reproduces the seller's transport copy rather than buying it. Such 
a discrepancy would permit substantive rights to hinge on nor-
mally irrelevant aspects of the program contract. Apparent trivi-
alities would bind an unwary party. Courts should not permit the 
unfamiliar technology of computers to obscure the similarity of 
these computer program transactions. 
II. SERVICES IN PROGRAM CONTRACTS 
Even if a contract is a transaction in goods, the U.C.C. may 
not apply if those goods are incidental to a much larger service 
agreement.39 When a program contract includes substantial ser-
vice provisions, courts must sever the goods transaction from the 
services to include the program-copy sale under article 2. The 
law on such severance is unclear. In the frequently cited case of 
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 40 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that supplying blood in the course of hospital treat-
ment was not a sale of goods under the Uniform Sales Act, even 
though the patient paid for the blood separately. In similar blood 
cases under the U.C.C., courts have continued the rule forbidding 
severance. 41 A few courts extended the blood rule to typical com .. 
mercial settings, 42 most notably in Epstein v. Giannattasio, 43 
which held the sale of shampoo as part of a hairdressing treat-
ment to be outside the U.C.C. Most commentators, however, 
39. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 23, §§ 2-102:5, -105:10; Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, §§ 
3-6 (1968). 
40. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 762 (1954). 
41. E.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975); Lovett v. 
Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Foster v. Memorial Hosp. 
Assn., 219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975). 
42. E.g., Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co., 195 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961) (printing of books); Schenectady Steel Co. v. Bruno Trimpoli Gen. Constr. Co., 43 
App. Div. 2d 234, 350 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1974), affd., 34 N.Y.2d 939, 316 N.E.2d 875, 359 
N.Y.S.2d 560 (1975) (construction of a bridge); James Sausage Co. v. Novalco, Inc., 18 
U.C.C. Rep. 142 (Okla. 1975) (assembly of a chilling machine); Appeal of Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe, 82 Interior Dec. 238 (1975) (paving a road). See also Vitromar Piece Dye 
Works v. Lawrence of London, Ltd., 119 Ill. 2\.pp. 2d 301, 256 N.E.2d 135 (1969) (U.C.C. 
applied by analogy to waterproofing cloth). Cases involving medical services also contin-
ued the Perlmutter rule. See, e.g., Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 300 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1967) (pacemaker); Dorfman v. Austenal, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1966) (surgical pin). 
43. 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963). 
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limit Perlmutter to the risk allocations peculiar to medical treat-
ment and similar professional services. 44 Epstein also has been 
repudiated in a similar case, Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 45 ,be-
cause it relied too heavily on a technical.distinction between sales 
and services without closer examination of the contract. Subse-
quent cases have followed Newmark, 46 suggesting a trend toward 
applying article 2 to the sales portion of mixed contracts. 47 
Thus, additional computer services in a program contract 
need not lead a court to place the entire agreement outside of 
article 2. To evaluate the appropriateness of such a holding, this 
Note considers the classes of services most often joined with pro-
gram contracts: support services, programming, and data pro-
cessing. 
A. Support Services 
Support services comprise three different means of assisting 
the program buyer: installation support, systems support, and 
program support. Installation support includes copying the pro-
gram onto the buyer's memory device as well as instructing the 
buyer in the use of the program copy.48 Installation often accom-
44. See, e.g., 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 483, 486 (1975); 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 830, 832 
(1970); 46 N.D. L. REv. 367, 369 (1969). See also Balkowitch v. Minneapolis War Memorial 
Hosp., 270 Minn.151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc,, 102 N.J. Super. 
279, 246 A.2d 11 (App. Div. 1968), affd., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Jackson v. 
Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Law Div. 1967), reud. per curiam, 
53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969). 
45. 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (App. Div. 1968), affd., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 
967 (1969). 
46. E.g., Ellibee v. Dye, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 158 (1973). See also Jackson v. Muhlenberg 
Hosp. 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (Law Div. 1967), reud. per curiam, 53 N.J. 138, 
249 A.2d 65 (1969) (a blood case, similar to Perlmutter, in which the court reversed a 
decision based strictly on a distinction between sales and services; case remanded for 
further examination of the blood transaction). 
47. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 23, § 2-102:5. See also Annot., supra note 39, § 3. 
48. For example, the Burroughs Corporation's April 1976 Software and Support 
Agreement, a form contract on file with the Michigan Law Review, provides: "Installation 
Support shall include hardware orientation services and applications Program Product 
services ... and shall include consultant and guidance support requested by customer 
and agreed to be supplied by Burroughs. . .. " Installation support could include the 
service of a programmer modifying existing programs to make them compatible with the 
new program copy, since such additional services are part of the proper installation of the 
program copy. For instance, the Burroughs definition of "applications Program Product 
services" within the above installation support clause includes these additional program-
ming services. This Note, however, classifies such additional services as program support. 
See text at note 58 infra. 
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panies a sale of goods, 49 and courts have permitted even extensive 
installation services without removing contracts from article 2. 50 
When extensive installation is the parties' principal concern, as 
in construction contracts, courts render the entire agreement a 
service contract.51 This result is inappropriate, however, for com-
puter program installation support; installing a program copy 
may require no more than putting cards into a reader and pushing 
a button. This is indeed a small part of what the buyer bargains 
for. 
The second type of support, systems support, involves the 
periodic issuance of "releases" - new, improved program copies 
to replace old programs.52 This service of updating the program 
does not necessarily overwhelm the goods provisions of a program 
contract. Programs that perform adequately, especially systems 
programs, 53 still may be quite improvable. Under a systems sup-
49. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES 47 (1970): "Services always 
play an important role in the use of goods, whether it is the service of transforming the 
raw materials into some usable product or the service of distributing the usable product 
to a point where it can be easily obtained by the consumer." 
50. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) (installation provision 
does not remove a bowling alley contract from U.C.C. coverage). 
51. See, e.g., Mingledorff's Inc. v. Hicks, 133 Ga. App. 27, 209 S.E.2d 661 (1974) 
(contract for the installation of heating and air conditioning not under the U.C.C.); J & 
RElec. Div. of J.O. Mory Stores, Inc. v. Skoog Constr. Co., 38 Ill. App.3d 747, 348N.E.2d 
474 (1976) (same result on a subcontract for the installation of electrical wiring). But cf. 
Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 61 (1977) 
(U.C.C. applies to the sale and installation of carpet); Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co., 
147 N.J. Super. 77, 370 A.2d 547 (Law Div. 1977) (U.C.C. applies to the sale and installa-
tion of overhead doors). These cases suggest that courts are more willing to sever mixed 
installation and sales provisions if the contract is outside the construction setting. 
52. For instance, consider how this service is described in the Burroughs Corpora-
tion's Software and Support Agreement, supra note 48. 
Classification of Programming Services 
Category A (Systems Software and Supported Licensed Program). Burroughs will 
maintain and support the current version of System Software, firmware and Cate-
gory A Programs. . . . and will supply to Customer all revisions thereof released 
by Burroughs during the term of this license. . . . 
Systems support could include more than the issuance of new releases. The seller may 
provide the services of a programmer, called a systems analyst, both to develop new 
releases and to modify the buyer's existing program copies to make them compatible with 
the new releases. This Note, however, considers such additional services to be program 
support. See text at note 57 infra. 
53. Systems programs connect applications programs, which do the actual data pro-
cessing, and the computer system. One type of systems program, the operations program, 
performs administrative details, such as integrating the various parts of the computer 
hardware (memory, input and output, and processing), and communicating with the 
users. Another type of systems program, the compiler, translates applications program 
copies - usually written in human-oriented computer languages - into computer Ian-
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port clause, the buyer receives not a service, but a series of dis-
tinct goods in the form of new program copies.54 Such clauses give 
the buyer the equivalent of pocket parts for a law digest or year-
books for an encyclopedia and should not render the entire pro-
gram contract a service contract. 55 
The third type of support service is program support, the 
simplest type of which may be termed "debugging."G6 'Recog-
nizing that program copies may contain latent defects,67 the 
buyer and seller often agree that the seller will cure any defects 
that become apparent after the program copy is put to use. ox 
In such a program clause, the seller warrants that the program 
copy, which is the main subject of the contract, will perform 
guage. See generally Furth, supra note 9, at 81-83. Furth also describes another class of 
programs, referred to in this Note as editors, that help programmers modify program 
copies. 
Systems programs reflect the latest theories of computer science and therefore contin-
ually require improvement. They must be able to handle the many variations of instruc-
tions that exist in applications programs correctly. They are designed to interpret these 
applications programs optimally, and, even when they operate adequately, they can often 
be made more efficient. 
54. Each separate release is a program copy. A new release may be similar to the old 
program copy or identical to an older release, but this should not change the result. 
Different copies of the same record album, for instance, still constitute different goods. 
When the buyer receives a new program copy, technicians erase the old release from 
the memory device and record the new release in its place. The new release could be 
manufactured directly from the old release on the buyer's memory, but for practical 
reasons this is seldom done: it is easier and cheaper to make one master release and give 
copies to all customers. Even if a new release is manufactured on the buyer's memory 
device, it is a new good. Because the raw materials are reusable, the difference between 
repairing a program copy and replacing it is a matter of degree. A new release, however, 
presumably is quite different from the old release, since new systems programs generally 
are released only when the accumulated changes are significant. 
55. A similar situation exists when a buyer agrees to accept a prototype of a good with 
the understanding that the seller will replace the good with later models. The initial 
payments on such contracts tend to be low, since much of the cost of such goods lies in 
their development, not the actual materials. This is common where the prototype can best 
be perfected by testing in the field. See, e.g., U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwarz, Inc., 
358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd., 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975) (machinery using 
an "unproven process"); Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474,269 N.E.2d 
664 (1971) (experimental valve testing machines). Systems program copies can best be 
tested in the field, and their cost stems largely from research and development rather than 
materials used. 
56. Debugging is the painful process of removing defects ("bugs") from a program. 
57. See note 29 supra. 
58. Consider, for example, the language in the Burroughs Corporation's Software and 
Support Agreement, supra note 48: "Upon request, Burroughs will make a prompt and 
reasonable attempt to provide Customer with a program patch to correct or program 
around any error or malfunction." Such provisions become more important if the program 
is complex or specially designed. 
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as promised. 59 This service is clearly incidental to the sale of the 
program copy; indeed, it is very similar to the service obligation 
imposed by U.C.C. warranties.60 Not all program support ser-
vices, however, are so simple. 
Program support sometimes obligates the seller to make the 
buyer's existing programs compatible with the new program.61 
Where such services are minor, courts should deem them inciden-
tal to the sale of the program copy, much like installation. For 
two reasons, the result should be the same even when the seller 
supplies a staff of programmers for an extended time. First, such 
extensive program support probably would accompany either a 
contract for the installation of an entire computer system or a 
long-term systems support contract for new releases of program 
copies. In those situations, the program support, though exten-
sive, would be but a minor part of a mqch larger sales contract. 
Second, a court could view the modification of existing programs 
not as a service, but as the production and sale of new, distinct 
program copies. Under this view, the buyer would not contracffor 
a single program copy with extensive modification services, but 
rather, for a single prototype program copy and a series of similar 
programs. 62 
B. "'Programming Services 
A seller may also provide programming services with the sale 
of program copies. These services, unlike program support, are 
not linked to the sale of any particular program copy. Rather, 
sellers who provide programming services write new programs 
and modify existing and future program copies as the need arises. 
59. Note that in the case of a program contract in" which a copy in transport is 
identified to the contract, this form of program support is not strictly part of the curing 
process of the purchased good. The seller cures any defect by modifying the program copy 
in memory, not the transport program copy which is identified to the contract. This 
service arguably differs from that contemplated by U.C.C. § 2-608 provisions dealing with 
conditional acceptance. See note 29 supra. But this view is not compelled by the U.C.C. 
itself. If the seller did not promise program support to the buyer and the program copy 
on memory had hidden defects, U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(b) could be invoked to force the seller 
to cure the transported program copy, for any defects in the memory would simply reflect 
defects in the transported copy. In such cases, the cure of the memory copy satisfies the 
parties and fulfills the aims of U.C.C. § 2-608. 
60. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -315. 
61. Consider the Burroughs Corporation's Software Agreement, note 48 supra: 
"Burroughs will maintain Category B Program Product(s) to be compatible with the then 
current unaltered released System Software used on Designated Burroughs Equipment." 
62. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
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Some buyers simply hire their own programmer, whose employ-
ment is clearly a service contract. 63 Others contract for general 
programming services as part of a substantial ~omputer lease or 
sale. 64 Such combinations are difficult to classify as either sales 
or service contracts. 
When a supplier of services also supplies incidental materials 
or consumes materials while performing the services, courts tradi-
tionally hold that the entire agreement is a service contract.05 
This result, however, seems inappropriate for a program contract 
including programming services; the parties to a computer con-' 
tract could sign separate sales and service contracts, thus putting 
the sales portion within the U.C.C. The possibility of indepen-
dent contracts presents a particularly strong argument for sever-
ing the sales and service provisions, and applying article 2 to the 
sales portion. Classifying a contract with programming services 
exclusively as a service agreement ignores the relationship be-
tween the parties and the intent of the U.C.C.'s drafters. They 
intended the U.C.C. to be liberally construed to modernize the 
commercial law66 and to cover more than simple sales. Their use 
of the phrase "transactions in goods" rather than "sales of 
goods"67 evidences this broad intent. Uniformity in the law de-
mands that identical commercial transactions be accorded con-
sistent treatment, whether they involve one contract or two. 88 
Recognizing the parties' ability to use two contracts for program-
ming services, courts should sever the sales portion of the combi-
n_ation contract and grant it article 2 coverage. 
63. The argument in the text preceding note 62 supra, that the program support is 
not a service but an additional component of the whole sales contract, would seem applica-
ble here. In this light, programming services could be considered the manufacturing of' 
goods, and a programming services contract would therefore be a sales contract, There is 
a crucial difference, however, between program support and programming services. The 
former are well-defined and concern one program copy. The latter are open-ended and 
much more analogous to traditional professional services. 
64. For example, in a major installation of a computer system, the buyer usually hires 
a systems analyst from the seller. 
65. See notes 39-47 supra and accompanying text. 
66. u.c.c. § 1-102. 
67. U.C.C. § 2-102. See note 47 supra. 
68. Cf. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 
572 (7th Cir. 1976) (construction and delivery of a water tank held under U.C.C. even 
though large in size); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (in 
the interest of uniformity with states, transactions with the United States should be under 
U.C.C.); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App.176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972) (sale 
of electricity held under U.C.C. to conform with other states where U.C.C. covers sale of 
natural gas). 
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C. Data Processing Services 
The third group of services that a seller may combine with 
program sales is data processing. The considerable expense of 
maintaining a large computer system has fostered the data pro-
cessing industry, which serves customers who either cannot afford 
or choose not to maintain their own computer installation. 69 In a 
typical data processing arrangement, a business periodically de-
livers its records to the computer service center, and the service 
center records transactions, sends out bills, and returns updated 
records to the business. 70 The service center may create original 
programs for each customer, or it may use the same program 
package to serve them all. Ordinary customers, who may not even 
know those programs exist, care little about such things so long 
as the service center gets the processing done. The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has held that such arrangements are service 
contracts not covered by article 2 of the U.C.C.71 This is an appro-
priate conclusion: neither party to such a data processing con-
tract views the programs as severable from the larger service com-
mitment. · 
Certain data processing services, however, may involve 
transactions in goods that should be within the scope of 
article 2. For example, the customer may be entitled to copies 
of the programs upon termination of the contract. Such an agree-
ment requires the sale and future delivery of program copies as 
well as data processing services, and strongly suggests a trans-
action in goods, particularly at the moment of delivery. Since 
the program copy sale would be an article 2 transportation if 
performed through a separate contract, the severed sales portion 
of a single contract also should be subject to article 2. 72 
The U.C.C. should also control a data processing contract 
calling for the development of special programs to be stored in 
69. See generally GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973); Furth, supra 
note 9, at 84. See also Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 273 (N.D. Okla. 1973); Com-
Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd., 
458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972). 
70. See, e.g., Autotax, Inc. v. Data Input Corp., 136 Ga. App. 141, 220 S.E.2d 456 
(1975). See also Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. Supp.1251 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) (tax service); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 419 F. 
Supp. 1251 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (same). , 
71. Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), 
affd., 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971). 
72. See text at notes 65-68 supra. 
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space on the seller's memory that is leased to the buyer. The 
parties see those programs and the lease of memory space as 
specific elements of the larger data processing_ agreement. If a 
separate contract for the program copies and the lease of the 
seller's memory space would be a transaction in goods, courts 
should sever those provisions from the data processing contract 
and evaluate them under article 2. 73 • 
ill. CONCLUSION 
The novelty and complexity of computer programs frustrate 
the courts' evaluation of program contracts and the U.C.C. Tech-
nical and mathematical terms that confuse the untrained ob-
server pervade professional discussions of computer programs. N 
Unfamiliar terminology creates the danger of misunderstanding 
computer contracts and misapplying precedent.75 The language of 
contracts for programs also may cause confusion, using ambigu-
ous phrases such as "data processing services" or "program ser-
vices" where the more precise "program products" or "program 
copies" would be appropriate. But, even if unambiguous lan-
guage were used and understood, certain aspects of programs 
73. See text at notes 65-68 supra. 
74. See, e.g., Heinzman, supra note 3, at 184; Miller, supra note 5, at 113 (admitting 
that "software" has no exclusive definition). 
75. For example, in Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 
653 (D.S.C. 1970), affd., 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971), the court held that a contract for 
data processing services was not covered by article 2. The court, however, ambiguously 
defined the contract and this ambiguity could cause the case to be misinterpreted. The 
contract provided "data processing operations for Beacon in replacement of such opera-
tions then being presently internally performed on Beacon's own computer." 328 F. Supp. 
at 654. This explanation of the contract, standing alone, might suggest that the contract 
promised new program copies (new "internally performed operations"), rather than data 
processing services. The court noted, however, that in order to perform the contract, 
Computer Servicenters would purchase new computers. Since the firm probably would not 
need new computers simply to write new programs, one can infer that it needed the 
computers to perform data processing services. Under this interpretation of the facts, the 
decision refers only to contracts for data processing services and not to contracts for 
program copies. 
In North Am. Leisure Corp. v. A & B Duplicators, Ltd., 468 F.2d 695 (2d Cir, 1972), 
A & B duplicated a master tape given them by North American Leisure onto $50,000 worth 
of cassette, 8-track, and reel-to-reel tapes, and delivered these copies to distributors. Even 
though A & B supplied all the raw materials, the Second Circuit held that the contract 
was not a sales contract but a service contract. 
A commentator argues that North American Leisure classifies program contracts as 
service contracts, the service being the manufacturing and supplying of a program copy 
to the buyer. McGonial, Application of the UCC to Software Contracts, 2 COMPUTEn L. 
SERv. REP. § 3-3, art. 4. This argument extends the holding too far: In North American 
Leisure, the duplicator, A & B, did not make the master tape, but only copied it. 
0 
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would still make this issue particularly difficult to resolve. 
A contract for programs is labor-intensive: the actual cost of 
materials for a program copy is negligible. Thus, programming 
services appear to dominate the contract, especially since the 
labor involved, often the reduction of mathematical algorithms 
into machine-readable form, seems technical and esoteric. The 
ease of copying a computer program also complicates the issue. 
While that ease allows novel methods of program delivery, _it 
leaves the production of a program copy looking rather unlike 
traditional "transactions in goods." But novel manufacturing 
techniques should not confound the determination of what is a 
good. The U.C.C. covers other easily reproduced intellectual crea-
tions such as books and record albums without leaving courts 
perplexed and dissatisfied. 
Moreover, contractual formalities should not circumscribe 
the scope of the U.C.C.;76 a buyer should be able to acquire-a 
program copy in the most economical way without pondering the 
preservation of rights under article 2. This Note discusses a vari-
ety of computer transactions, most with similar economic and 
practical results: the buyer uses a program copy, owned or leased, 
on some computer memory device. Applying article 2 to all these 
transactions assures uniform treatment77 and allows business in-
novation in an atmosphere of relative legal certainty.78 
76. See the Official Comments to U.C.C. §§ 2-201,-209. 
77. The U.C.C. applies to some program transactions such as sales of software or of 
programmed memory devices. It would be anomalous not to apply it to other program 
transactions identical except in the method of delivery of the program copy. 
78. See U.C.C. § 2-102. To apply the U.C.C. in program cases only when an actual 
physical exchange of software has taken place and not when it has been borrowed and 
copied (or when data transmission has been used) would force parties to forgo convenient 
business practices, hindering the development of the industry. · 
